The Reality of Introducing a 4.5-Day Work Week and Future Legislative Reform Tasks

1. Introduction: The Rise of the Debate on a 4.5-Day Workweek

Recently, discussions on introducing a four-day workweek and a 4.5-day workweek have rapidly gained momentum, driven largely by political circles and the government. In particular, following Samsung Electronics’ announcement of a pilot program for a 4.5-day workweek, politicians across the aisle have embraced the agenda as a symbol of “improved quality of life” and “labor innovation,” taking the lead in shaping the public discourse. The Democratic Party of Korea has introduced a series of bills aimed at reducing working hours—including amendments to the Labor Standards Act and the Framework Act on Employment Policy—and is accelerating efforts to build public consensus with the long-term goal of transitioning to a four-day workweek. The party leadership has made clear through National Assembly speeches and other channels that it intends to move from a 4.5-day schedule toward a four-day system, while actively holding meetings with labor unions and civil society organizations.

At the government level, formal policy review has also begun. In June 2025, the Ministry of Employment and Labor reported a plan to introduce a 4.5-day workweek to the National Planning Commission, stating that it would pursue pilot projects and, in parallel, advance related legislation. This is considered the first case in which the government has officially adopted the institutionalization of a four-day/4.5-day workweek as a policy agenda. This trend aligns with the values of younger generations who place a stronger emphasis on work–life balance, and pilot programs are increasingly being introduced in public institutions and some private-sector firms.

However, the debate over a 4.5-day workweek still tends to be driven more by emotional expectations and political pledges than by rigorous analysis. If the system is introduced without detailed assessment of sector-specific feasibility, labor market structure, productivity impacts, and wage-setting mechanisms, its effectiveness and sustainability will inevitably be called into question. For the system to take root, concrete institutional design must accompany the discussion—such as flexible implementation models, differentiated approaches by industry, and productivity-enhancement strategies. A structural and balanced approach is required—one that goes beyond the simplistic framing of “working less and resting more.”

2. Review of the Current Five-Day Workweek and the Labor Law Framework on Working Hours

In the early 2000s, Korea undertook lengthy social deliberation and institutional design in preparation for adopting a “five-day workweek.” At the time, the process was not limited to reducing the number of workdays; it included extensive analysis of how the reform would affect industry and society as a whole. Businesses, labor unions, academia, and civil society participated in discussions on potential challenges and opportunities arising from the reform, including productivity changes, wage systems, education, and corporate management practices. Structural changes in the economy—such as informatization, automation, and the expansion of the service sector—also supported the transition. As a result, the five-day workweek, though not without friction, gradually became established.

The current five-day workweek is based on Articles 50 and 53 of the Labor Standards Act (hereinafter, the “Act”). Statutory working hours, excluding break time, may not exceed 40 hours per week and 8 hours per day. Where the employer and employee agree, overtime work is permitted up to 12 hours per week. The Act also provides for flexible and selective working-hour systems. Under Articles 51 and 51-2, an employer may apply a flexible working-hour arrangement within a period of up to three months, provided there is a written agreement with the employee representative. Under Article 52, an employer may adopt a selective working-hour arrangement within a period of up to one month (or up to three months for R&D tasks involving new products or new technologies), also subject to a written agreement with the employee representative, allowing employees to flexibly allocate working hours that exceed daily or weekly limits.

The “52-hour workweek” system has been implemented in phases since 2018 depending on company size and now applies to nearly all workplaces. This legal framework has become a minimum safeguard designed to protect workers’ health and quality of life.

Against this background, the new administration’s recent discussion of a “4.5-day workweek” is unfolding in a markedly different manner. Unlike the five-day workweek, which was institutionalized through years of social consensus and preparation, the current debate is moving ahead largely on the normative claim that “reducing work improves quality of life.” Although limited pilot cases exist—such as Samsung Electronics’ 4.5-day trial and pilots in certain public agencies—these experimental examples are not sufficient grounds to justify immediate nationwide institutionalization.

In particular, the 4.5-day proposal is being translated into policy without empirical analysis of key issues such as whether productivity will increase, whether wages can be maintained, whether different occupations can accept the change, and how work will be redistributed. Even though foreseeable problems exist—such as increased work intensity and performance pressure, higher labor costs for SMEs, and disparities in applicability across industries—an approach that emphasizes institutional adoption without realistic alternatives is likely to deepen confusion and imbalance in the labor market.

Moreover, reducing working hours is not achievable by cutting “clock time” alone. To generate real benefits, reforms must be accompanied by productivity innovation, process improvement, restructuring of employment systems, and changes in organizational culture. A radical, institution-first approach risks social backlash and may leave behind ineffective administration without tangible outcomes.

In short, the 4.5-day workweek debate remains largely a normative approach based on the belief that “less work will improve life,” without clear evidence on productivity or labor-market structure. A policy that pushes institutional adoption without examining wage maintenance, work redistribution, and job-specific feasibility may instead intensify labor-market imbalance and job insecurity.

3. Practical Challenges of Introducing a 4.5-Day Workweek
◩ Differences in Feasibility Across Industries and Occupations

A proposal to reduce working days cannot be applied uniformly across all industries and occupations. Digital roles centered on non-face-to-face work—such as IT, design, and content planning—are structurally more suited to flexible schedules and remote work, and therefore may experience relatively limited disruption under a four-day framework. In contrast, manufacturing, logistics, service, and care sectors typically require on-site attendance and face-to-face work. In such industries, even one day of operational “gap” can translate directly into disrupted production or service delivery, requiring additional staffing through shift coverage—an often unmanageable cost burden for SMEs.

In manufacturing, in particular, equipment utilization rates and process continuity are directly tied to productivity. Introducing a four-day schedule can reduce production days and increase equipment downtime, affecting the entire production system. In sectors premised on year-round operations—such as hospitals, care facilities, and retail outlets—reducing workdays without additional staffing is effectively impossible. As a result, a uniform制度 may end up imposing structural burdens disproportionately on SMEs and certain industries.

Current law already provides various mechanisms to accommodate sectoral and occupational differences by allowing flexible adjustment of working hours. A representative example is the flexible working-hour system by industry. Under Article 51 of the Labor Standards Act, working hours may be adjusted flexibly on a daily or weekly basis within a given period, so long as average weekly working hours do not exceed 40 hours. For example, in manufacturing, ICT, and the content industry—where workloads often concentrate during specific periods—firms can increase hours during busy periods and reduce hours during slower periods. This system requires a written agreement with the employee representative and can be operated on a two-week or three-month basis. In recent amendments, it has become possible to adopt a six-month flexible working-hour system, increasing its usefulness in industries with seasonal workload fluctuations or project-based roles. The fact that such flexibility is already feasible under the current framework should be a key policy consideration in the debate on a four-day workweek.

◩ Increased Performance Pressure from Reduced Working Days

While a 4.5-day workweek may appear to promote work–life balance, if workloads remain unchanged, it may instead increase burdens through compressed work. In other words, workers may be required to complete the same amount of work in fewer days, resulting in a structure that demands greater concentration and energy over the remaining four days.

Indeed, in some pilot cases where four-day schemes were introduced, workers reported that “work intensity became excessively high, and fatigue actually increased.” This tends to be more pronounced in workplaces where job characteristics or project schedules are less flexible. In performance-sensitive organizations, reduced hours can translate into intensified performance pressure, increasing stress and the risk of burnout. Without ensuring the quality of rest in practice, a 4.5-day workweek may lead not to improved quality of life, but to concentrated and repeated fatigue.

◩ Reducing Working Hours Without Productivity Gains Burdens the Economy

Working-day reductions require accompanying structural measures—such as productivity strategies, process innovation, digital automation, and improved collaboration structures. Without such foundations, working-hour reduction pursued through legislation or political pledges may distort business activity.

Korea is known for relatively long working hours, yet its hourly labor productivity remains low compared with major advanced economies. As of 2023, Korea’s hourly labor productivity was USD 54.64, barely exceeding half the level of the United States (USD 97.05), Germany (USD 93.81), and France (USD 88.15).

Under these conditions, if working-day reductions are prioritized without productivity improvements, firms may be forced to hire additional workers to cover reduced days, or to redesign overtime and compensation systems for existing employees. This leads not only to higher direct costs but also to greater managerial uncertainty and decision-making risk.

SMEs, in particular, are highly sensitive to rising fixed costs due to high labor-cost shares and often lack the capacity to respond to reductions in statutory working days. At the macro level, such institutional changes may translate into reduced investment, fewer hires, and increased rigidity in the domestic employment environment—ultimately becoming a factor encouraging firms to relocate or exit.

In this sense, the 4.5-day workweek should not be pursued as a political slogan or a short-term popularity measure. Feasibility and effects vary significantly depending on industrial structure, firm conditions, and job characteristics, and a forced uniform adoption may instead lead to lower job quality and weaker economic dynamism. Therefore, realistic working-hour policy must begin not with one-size-fits-all legalization, but with institutional design that balances flexibility with practicality.

4. Misconceptions and Realities Regarding Working Hours in Korea

Korea has long been classified as a “long-hours work country.” According to OECD statistics, Korea’s annual working hours per worker in 2023 stood at 1,874 hours—about 157 hours higher than the OECD average of 1,717. At face value, these figures suggest Korea remains a society characterized by overwork. However, this interpretation contains a significant statistical illusion.

The reason working hours appear high is rooted in the structure of Korea’s labor market—particularly differences in the share of self-employed workers and part-time workers. According to KDI analysis, a 1 percentage-point increase in the share of self-employed workers is associated with an average increase of 10 annual working hours, whereas a 1 percentage-point increase in the share of part-time workers is associated with a decrease of 9 hours.

As of 2021, Korea’s share of self-employed workers was 23.9%, far higher than the OECD average (17.0%). By contrast, Korea’s share of part-time workers was 12.9%, lower than the OECD average (14.3%). Self-employed individuals often work long hours to sustain their livelihoods and businesses, while part-time workers tend to work relatively fewer hours. These compositional differences drive Korea’s annual working-hour figure above the OECD average.

When recalculated to reflect these structural differences, Korea’s annual working hours in 2021 decline from 1,910 hours to 1,829 hours, and the gap with the OECD average shrinks by about 83 hours—from 264 hours to 181 hours. In other words, once employment structure is taken into account, Korea’s “real” working hours may not be excessively higher than the OECD average.

To be sure, even after adjustment, Korea remains among the top long-hours countries in the OECD (third). Yet it is important to recognize that the cause is not simply a culture of “working too much,” but institutional and structural features such as the high share of self-employment and the relative shortage of part-time jobs. This suggests that the issue cannot be resolved merely by legally mandating shorter working hours.

Another notable point is the rapid compression of working hours over a short period. Korea reported annual working hours of 2,119 in 2011 when it first submitted the data to the OECD, but this figure fell to 1,874 by 2023—an overall reduction of 245 hours in 12 years. This is a very rapid change compared with Japan, which reduced working hours by 259 hours over 28 years (1995–2023).

These changes also represent meaningful progress. For example, the gap in annual working hours between Korea and the United States was 286 hours in 2011, but narrowed to 64 hours by 2023. Korea also became a country with shorter working hours than Israel, which had much shorter working hours than Korea in 2011 (Israel: 1,939 hours). This can be interpreted as evidence that working-hour reductions occurred rapidly through制度 and corporate practices.

However, such rapid change has also produced side effects. SME groups have consistently called for greater flexibility in overtime since the introduction of the 52-hour workweek, and the government has still not fully applied working-hour limits to very small businesses with fewer than five employees. Nevertheless, discussions on introducing a four-day system continue under the slogan that working hours should be reduced even further.

Therefore, rather than simply legalizing a 4.5-day workweek, Korea needs institutional design that can address both overwork among the self-employed and the lack of employment flexibility. Expanding flexible work arrangements—such as flexible schedules, time-selective jobs, remote work, and staggered commuting—should be prioritized, along with reviewing rigid wage systems and working-hour regulations centered on standard full-time employment. Such reforms can also contribute to broader labor-market participation and reduced career interruptions across different groups, including parents, older workers, and those requiring re-skilling.

Ultimately, the question is not simply that Korea’s working hours are “long,” but why they appear that way. Policy design should start from a flexible approach that reflects structural causes rather than relying solely on average figures.

5. Flexibility in Working-Hour Management: Lessons from International Cases

The most important element in international comparisons regarding a four-day workweek is “flexibility.” While many advanced economies have relatively shorter weekly working hours, cases where a four-day workweek is uniformly mandated by law are extremely rare. What these countries have in common is that reductions in working hours are achieved not through top-down uniform policies, but gradually through autonomous choices and negotiations in workplaces. Policy capacity is therefore focused less on designing a single mandatory制度 and more on increasing the feasibility and usability of flexible arrangements. The prevailing global trend is to activate selective and flexible systems that enable firms and workers to adjust working days and hours to real-world conditions.

The United States is often cited as a representative case of autonomous adoption. Since there is no federal statutory cap on working hours, the adoption of a four-day workweek is determined entirely by corporate decisions and agreements with workers (Kim Min-seop, 2023). Although some politicians have proposed bills to legislate a 32-hour workweek, there has been no case of such a制度 being mandated or institutionalized at the federal level. In the private sector, various forms of flexible work arrangements are widely used, and the four-day workweek has naturally emerged as one of these options (Yoo et al., 2009). For example, firms increasingly rely on selective or flexible working-hour systems to maintain high concentration while considering workers’ quality of life, alongside remote and work-from-home policies. Especially in IT, design, and startup industries, the four-day workweek is often viewed as a strategy that can enhance both productivity and creativity.

Japan, historically characterized by deeply rooted long-hours work culture, has recently pursued various institutional experiments to reduce working hours (Seong et al., 2024). While it does not mandate a four-day workweek by law, Japan has built a flexible framework encouraging companies and workers to design work arrangements autonomously. Notable mechanisms include the selective working-hour system and the discretionary labor system. The selective working-hour system allows day-to-day working hours to be adjusted flexibly within a fixed total number of hours, while discretionary work emphasizes results over time spent. These systems provide practical flexibility for households seeking work–family balance and for workers facing personal circumstances such as childcare or caregiving responsibilities (Yoo et al., 2009). The Japanese government has also expanded incentives for firms and focused on disseminating best practices to support adoption.

European countries similarly approach the four-day workweek through “social dialogue” rather than government mandates. The United Kingdom and Germany have implemented pilot projects led by government, but decisions on broader adoption are ultimately left to autonomous negotiations between firms and unions (Seong et al., 2024). Many participating firms have expressed interest in continuing the制度 due to improved worker satisfaction and productivity, but participation remains optional rather than obligatory. Belgium is a relatively leading example in that it legally allows workers to compress a five-day workload into four days. However, this approach does not reduce total working hours; it adjusts the distribution of working hours, aiming at flexibility rather than time reduction. Other European countries such as France and the Netherlands also design policies not around mandated reductions but around greater diversity in work forms to improve quality of life (Seong et al., 2024).

In conclusion, there are very few countries that legally mandate a four-day workweek. Most prioritize flexibility and autonomy, focusing less on the four-day scheme itself and more on creating an environment where various flexible arrangements can be used in combination. The role of government is closer to that of an enabler—supporting experimental models and preparing institutional foundations—rather than acting as a normative enforcer. This reflects a policy direction that acknowledges the complexity and diversity of labor markets and seeks balance between workers’ quality of life and firms’ productivity. Korea should likewise consider this global trend and focus on creating a work environment where autonomous choice is feasible, rather than pursuing uniform institutional adoption.

6. Future Legislative and Policy Tasks: Expanding Flexibility and Autonomy in Working Hours

A uniform introduction of a 4.5-day workweek may fail to reflect Korea’s industrial structure and employment realities, and may instead cause confusion at worksites. What Korea needs now is not legislation that mandates the same number of workdays for all, but the expansion of tailored flexible work arrangements that fit different industries, job categories, and firm sizes. The Labor Standards Act already provides mechanisms such as the selective working-hour system, flexible working-hour system, and discretionary labor system, and there are legal tools beyond the 52-hour cap that allow working hours to be adjusted flexibly.

The problem is not the absence of制度, but the 현실 that SMEs cannot actually adopt them. SMEs often lack digital systems and management infrastructure needed to operate flexible work arrangements, and their capacity to implement such systems is inherently limited. Even where some firms have introduced them, genuine autonomy over working hours may not be guaranteed, and there are cases where workers using pilot remote work or staggered commuting arrangements suffer disadvantages in performance evaluations. Compared with adopting a 4.5-day workweek, higher policy priority should be given to supporting the active use of existing flexible working-hour systems (selective and flexible working-hour arrangements) not only in large firms but also in SMEs.

The new administration’s recent discussion of a 4.5-day workweek is taking a direction in which the state enacts a separate law to support reductions in actual working hours and effectively imposes the change. Therefore, the necessary solution is to expand flexibility and autonomy within the existing working-hour framework of the Labor Standards Act. This would require amendments to Articles 51, 51-2, 52, 53, and 59, among others. Specifically, this report proposes: extending the applicable period for the flexible working-hour system from up to six months to up to one year; expanding the selective working-hour system period from one month (three months for R&D) to six months (one year for R&D); and broadening the scope of special exemptions for working hours to include advanced strategic industries such as AI and semiconductors. In other words, granting both employers and workers greater freedom to choose when to work can help improve labor productivity as well.

Korean version: https://www.cfe.org/20250702_27852