As the Population Shrinks, Local Governments Have Grown

Writer
CFE

Korea’s resident registration population declined by 578,838, or 1.1%, from 51,696,216 in 2016 to 51,117,378 in 2025. Over the same period, the authorized staffing level for local public officials increased by 76,589, or 24.9%, from 307,566 to 384,155. The number of local public officials per 10,000 residents rose from 59.5 to 75.2, while the number of residents served by each official fell from about 168 to 133. Differences in statistical scope—such as between authorized staffing and actual headcount, and the conversion of positions to national civil service status—must be taken into account, but it is clear that the long-term trajectories of population and local government staffing sharply diverged (Ministry of the Interior and Safety, various years).

The same pattern appears in the 2017–2025 panel linking 226 basic local governments under a consistent standard. While the resident registration population in the regions analyzed fell by 1.5%, the actual number of local public officials increased by 18.6%. Population declined in 174 of the 226 jurisdictions, while the number of public officials increased in 225. In particular, 173 fell into the category of “population decline, increase in public officials.” This result does not necessarily mean that an increase in public officials is inefficient, but it does indicate that the expansion of local government staffing showed much stronger incremental growth than population change.

Outside the Seoul metropolitan area, the population declined by 4.7% while the number of local public officials increased by 15.5%. In county areas, the population fell by 5.7%, but the number of public officials rose by 15.4%, and the number of officials per 10,000 residents increased from 113.2 to 138.6. In the 89 depopulation areas designated by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, the population declined by 10.1%, whereas the number of public officials increased by 14.0%. In these areas, the number of public officials per 10,000 residents rose from 113.2 to 143.5, and the number of public officials increased in all 89 jurisdictions.

Local extinction does generate some new administrative demand. Elderly care, visiting welfare services, management of vacant homes and idle facilities, maintenance of infrastructure in dispersed settlements, local transportation, and disaster response may become more burdensome even as the population shrinks. However, rising local extinction risk cannot by itself justify permanent organizations and increases in authorized staffing. The revised Local Extinction Risk Index of the Korea Employment Information Service is a demographic structural indicator measuring a region’s reproductive sustainability by converting into a percentage the ratio of women aged 20–39 to the population aged 65 and over, while the Ministry of the Interior and Safety’s designation of depopulation areas is a policy classification based on a combination of population, density, youth out-migration, aging, fiscal conditions, and other factors. Neither indicator directly measures the workload of individual departments or appropriate staffing levels (Lee Sangho, 2024·2025; Ministry of the Interior and Safety, 2021).

If only newly created tasks resulting from population decline are presented, without offsetting them against reduced workloads in resident registration, civil complaints, education, development, and facility use, as well as productivity gains from digitalization and the possibility of shared administration, staffing levels will continue to rise. Accordingly, staffing increases should be based not on whether a region is a “high-risk extinction area,” but on net additional administrative demand by function. A principle is needed under which increases in staffing are permitted only when reductions in existing work and efficiency gains are deducted from new demand, and the remaining workload is permanent and difficult to handle through internal reallocation.

Reform should not mean returning to a system in which the central government directly approves local staffing levels. The problem with the current standard personnel cost system lies not in local autonomy itself, but in the lack of transparency in the basis for calculation, insufficient regional participation, and weak ex post oversight by residents and local councils. The central government should provide common indicators, comparative data, and minimum service standards, while local governments should be allowed to decide their own organizations and staffing autonomously within a system that holds them accountable to residents for costs and performance (Ryu Young-a, 2025; Jisoo Kim, Jimin Choi, and Jayoung Yoo, 2024).

The local public finance system must also incorporate both equalization and growth incentives. Providing local allocation tax and subsidies to regions with small populations and limited tax bases is necessary to guarantee minimum services everywhere in the country. However, if transfer revenues offset the results of efforts to expand own-source revenue and improve expenditure efficiency, dependence may become entrenched. The portion guaranteeing basic services should be separated from performance and innovation incentives, and gains from population retention, increases in employment and business establishments, net growth in local tax revenue and recurring non-tax revenue, expenditure restructuring, and shared administration should result in tangible fiscal benefits for the region.

Over the medium to long term, greater autonomy in the operation of local taxes and non-tax revenue should allow regional economic growth to be more directly linked to local tax revenue. Consideration should be given to the practical use of flexible tax rates, selective taxation and burden systems aligned with local external costs and benefits, the reasonable adjustment of user fees and charges to realistic levels, the utilization of idle public property, and the allocation of tax bases linked to local employment, consumption, and business activity. Equalization to prevent widening fiscal disparities should be maintained, but an “incentive-compatible” system is needed so that when regions expand their tax base, the gains are not entirely offset by reductions in grants.

The report’s conclusion is not a simple argument for workforce cuts. Regions with growing populations should strengthen staffing where needed, while regions with declining populations should reduce management and support functions and overlapping organizations while strengthening welfare, safety, and frontline services. Making local government smaller does not mean reducing necessary services; it means reducing unnecessary organizations, fixed costs, and dependence on transfer revenues. Making local government more capable means reallocating limited personnel and financial resources to changing demands, expanding the local economy and own-source revenue, and being able to explain the results to residents.

Table

Empirical Analysis Results on Population Decline and Growth in Local Public Officials by City, County, and District