Samsung Electronics Labor-Management Agreement and a Law-and-Economics Analysis of Replacement Worker Regulations
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Writer
CFE
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This report examines, in light of the May 2026 agreement between Samsung Electronics management and labor, how restrictions on replacement labor under Korean labor law affect the bargaining power of large-enterprise unions and firms’ freedom to continue operations. The agreement is positive in that it avoided a general strike, but it also reveals an institutional paradox: the greater the potential losses from a strike, the stronger the union’s bargaining power becomes.
This report analyzes how Article 43 of the Trade Union Act, which restricts replacement labor, both ensures the effectiveness of the right to strike and allows wage and performance-bonus demands to become detached from market value through solidarity strikes between replaceable workers and core personnel. It then compares the U.S. distinction between economic strikes and unfair labor practice strikes with Japan’s restrictions on external labor-market intermediaries, and argues for the need to redesign the balance between protecting the right to strike and preserving the freedom to continue operations.
The labor-management conflict at Samsung Electronics, a symbol of South Korea’s semiconductor industry, has reached the unprecedented threshold of a full-scale strike. As of May 2026, the National Samsung Electronics Labor Union, backed by an overwhelming 93.1% approval rate, continues last-minute post-mediation proceedings at the National Labor Relations Commission, heightening tensions across industry. This situation goes beyond a dispute at a single company and is intertwined with the immunity framework of the amendments to Articles 2 and 3 of the Trade Union Act, which took effect last March, namely the Yellow Envelope Act (Revised Labor Commission Act).
The dispute appears to be spreading into a broader spring labor offensive across the entire industrial ecosystem, including subcontracted workers’ unions at SK hynix demanding bargaining with the primary contractor, the visible prospect of strikes within the Kakao community, and solidarity actions by Hyundai Mobis affiliates. Accordingly, diagnosing the structural issues and ripple effects of strikes from an economic perspective and seeking integrated solutions is an extremely urgent task for macroeconomic stabilization.
I. Raising the Issue
II. South Korea: Article 43 of the Trade Union Act and Restrictions on Replacement Labor
1. The Content and Institutional Purpose of Article 43 of the Trade Union Act
2. The Economic Problems of the Ban on Replacement Labor: Solidarity Strikes and Pressure for Wage Increases
III. United States: The Distinction Between Economic Strikes and Unfair Labor Practice Strikes
1. U.S. Legal System and Case Law: Permitting Replacement Labor in Economic Strikes
2. The Economic Significance of Allowing Permanent Replacement Labor
IV. Japan: Restricting the Involvement of External Intermediary Agencies Instead of a General Ban on Replacement Labor
V. The Macroeconomic Context of Korea’s Labor Market
1. The Economic Implications of the Revised Provisions
2. Channels Through Which Governance Costs Increase
3. Bargaining Uncertainty and Prolonged Strikes
4. The Trade-off Between Employment Reduction and Investment
VI. Comparison and Policy Implications
References
1. Korean Laws and Judicial Precedents
2. U.S. Laws and Judicial Precedents
3. Japanese Laws and Materials
4. Academic Materials
5. Statistics and Official Materials
6. Media Coverage – Tentative Agreement and Negotiation Progress
7. Media Coverage – Comparative Cases and Domino Effects
Original title: 삼성전자 노사 합의와 대체근로 규제의 법경제학적 고찰
Author: Seung-gyu Sim / In-yeop Ji
Date: 2026-05-28
Source: https://www.cfe.org/bbs/bbsDetail.php?cid=report&pn=1&idx=29088
